

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 QUITO 01067 01 OF 03 172131Z
ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 INRE-00
NSAE-00 DODE-00 L-01 NSCE-00 PA-01 SP-02 PM-03
OES-02 DLOS-02 ACDA-10 IO-06 /053 W
-----079579 172236Z /75

O R 172040Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7346
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 QUITO 1067

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR PEPR EC PE CI
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ON ECUADORE-PERU DISPUTE

REF: (A) STATE 040486; (B) QUITO 0919

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN 75 MINUTE DISCUSSION WITH CHARGE
FEBRUARY 15, FOREIGN MINISTER JOSE AYALA PRESENTED
LATEST GOE VIEWS ON PROBLEMS WITH PERU. AYALA GAVE A LENGTHY
HISTORY OF THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON ECUADOR'S EFFORTS TO
OBTAIN SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO AMAZON AND PERU'S DESIRE TO HAVE
ECUADOR RECOGNIZE RIO PROTOCOL. THESE EFFORTS SEEMED TO HAVE
BEGUN TO REACH FRUITION AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST 1976 WHEN
PERU GAVE ECUADOR A DRAFT STATEMENT WHICH WOULD SERVE AS THE
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. AYALA BECAME
AWARE THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS CHANGING AT THE
TIME OF THE PERUVIAN NAVY'S ATTACK ON AN ECUADOREAN
FISHING BOAT IN NOVEMBER 1976, WHEN, ACCORDING TO AYALA'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 QUITO 01067 01 OF 03 172131Z

SPECULATION, HARDLINERS IN THE PERU ARMY RESISTED THE MORE
ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT MORALES BERMUDEZ AND
FOREIGN MINISTER DE LA PUENTE. AYALA HOLDS THAT PERU'S
REACTION TO THE JANUARY BORDER INCIDENTS FLAP AND TO HIS
FEBRUARY 9 SPEECH HAS BEEN WILDLY DISPROPORTIONATE. GOE
NOW SUSPECTS THAT PERU MAY BE PURPOSELY SEEKING ESCALATION
IN ORDER TO FOSTER A WAR-LIKE ATMOSPHERE. FOR THIS REASON,

GOEHTAS DECIDED TO MAKE NO FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS, DESPITE WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE PROVOCATION. AYALA BELIEVES THAT PERU'S DESIRE TO DISTURB THE COUNTRY FROM ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THE DIVERSION OF ATTENTION BY CHILE TO ARGENTINA, AND A DECISION BY PERUVIAN MILITARY TO EXTRICATE PERU FROM BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT GIVING OFFENSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER MAY BE BEHIND THE PRESENT PERUVIAN ATTITUDE. GOE HAS POSTPONED A SCHEDULED TRIP TO LIMA NEXT WEEK BY CHIEF OF JOINT COMMAND ADMIRAL OLMEDO NEXT WEEK OUT OF FEAR THAT IN CURRENT ATMOSPHERE AN UNPLEASANT INCIDENT COULD OCCUR, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN. AYALA PLEADED WITH US TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET PERU TO ADOPT A MORE RATIONAL AND LESS BELLICOSE ATTITUDE. END SUMMARY.

2. I MET WITH FONMIN JOSE AYALA LASSO THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 16 FOR 75 MINUTES AT HIS REQUEST TO DISCUSS FURTHER ECUADOREAN VIEWS ON THE LATEST FLAREUP WITH PERU. IT WAS A FOLLOW-UP AND FURTHER AMPLIFICATION OF OUR FEB 11. CONVERSATION (REF B). POLCOUNS SUTTON WAS ALSO PRESENT.

3. FONMIN AYALA BEGAN BY SUGGESTING THAT THE ECUADOREAN-PERUVIAN PROBLEM IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE IMMEDIATE ANDEAN REGION BUT FOR ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. HE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD AN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 QUITO 01067 01 OF 03 172131Z

IMPORTANT POTENTIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE AND THAT THE US COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND WHICH HAS LED TO THE PRESENT CONTRASTS.

4. BEHIND IT ALL, HE SAID, WAS ECUADOR'S BITTER FRUSTRATION OVER THE IMPOSITION BY TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY NATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, OF THE RIO PROTOCOL IN 1942. THIS, HE SAID, WAS A FACT OF LIFE THAT CANNOT BE DENIED. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WITH THE RIO PROTOCOL IN ECUADOREAN EYES WAS ITS DENIAL OF SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE AMAZON TO ECUADOR, WHICH HAD BEEN GUARANTEED THROUGH A SERIES OF TREATIES AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SPAIN. AYALA ADOPTED VARIOUS PHASES THAT ECUADOR HAD PASSED THROUGH WITH RESPECT TO THE RIO PROTOCOL, BUT SAID ECUADOR HAD DECIDED BY 1968 THAT INTENSIFIED POLEMICS WITH PERU WOULD NOT LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. IN THAT YEAR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE RENEWED AND ECUADOR BEGAN A CAMPAIGN FOR SEEKING A MORE HARMONIOUS CLIMATE IN WHICH TO WORK OUT ITS PROBLEMS. IN 1971 THE FIRST TENTATIVE TALKS ON THE BOJER PROBLEM WERE HELD BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

AT THE AYUCUCHO CONFERENCE TWO YEARS AGO, A MORE INDEPTH EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE AND A SERIES OF DIPLOMATIC VISITS ENSUED IN WHICH THE OUTSTANDING BOUNDARY PROBLEMS WERE TREATED.

5. THE CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS BEGAN AT THE SANTIAGO MEETING COMMEMORATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF SANTIAGO IN AUGUST LAST YEAR. AYALA MET AT LENGTH ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS WITH PERUVIAN FONMIN DE LA PUENTE SPECIFICALLY IN ORDER TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ECUADOREAN SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE AMAZON. THE BORDER WAS EXAMINED BY THE TWO SIDES SECTOR BY SECTOR TO SEE WOULD COULD BE DONE. IT WAS AGREED THAT ACCESS IN THE PROXIMITY OF THE UNDEMARCATED BOUNDARY WOULD BE EASIEST FOR BOTH SIDES TO DEAL WITH. AYALA
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 QUITO 01067 01 OF 03 172131Z

RELATED AN ANECDOTE FROM THAT MEETING WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS SIGNIFICANT IN VIEW OF RECENT PERUVIAN ATTEMPTS TO GLOSS OVER THE FACT THEY HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT TERRITORY. AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREEPORT OR CUSTOM ZONE FOR ECUADOR AT THE CONFLUENCE OF THE NAPO AND AMAZON, BUT DE LA PUENTE HAD REMONSTRATED WITH HIM TELLING HIM THAT THAT WAS NOT WHAT ECUADOREEANS WERE TALKING ABOUT BECAUSE IT DID NOT INCLUDE SOVEREIGN ACCESS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 QUITO 01067 02 OF 03 172157Z

ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 INRE-00
NSAE-00 DODE-00 L-01 NSCE-00 PA-01 SP-02 PM-03
OES-02 DLOS-02 ACDA-10 IO-06 /053 W
-----079957 172237Z /75

O R 172040Z FEB 78

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7347

INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMQBASSY LIMA 4341

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 QUITO 1067

LIMDIS

AT THAT TIME DE LA PUENTE SAID HE WOULD TASK A STUDY GROUP OF TECHNICIANS WITH COMING UP WITH A RECOMMENDATION ABOUT POSSIBLE CORRIDOR ROUTES. WHEN DE LA PUENTE RAISED THE MATTER OF THE QUID PRO QUO, AYALA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK IT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT, HE PERSONALLY REALIZED THAT THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIO PROTOCOL WAS THE SINE QUA NON. ON THE BASIS OF THAT CONVERSATION A DRAFT FRAMEWORK STATEMENT WAS PREPARED BY PERU AND GIVEN TO ECUADOR FOR REVIEW. ECUADOR RETURNED THE DRAFT TO PERU AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER SUGGESTING WHAT AYALA TERMED WAS A MINOR CHANGE. ACCORDING TO AYALA, THE CHANGE CONSISTED OF SUBSTITUTING THE PHRASE "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS BILATERAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING ECUADOR'S DESIRE FOR SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE AMAZON AND PERU'S VIEWS ON THE VALIDITY OF THE RIO PROTOCOL" FOR THE PHRASE "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ECUADOR'S DESIRE FOR SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE AMAZON AND PERU'S VIEWS ON THE VALIDITY OF SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 QUITO 01067 02 OF 03 172157Z

THE RIO PROTOCOL, ETC...". (AYALA DID NOT REFER TO NOTES AND THIS IS ONLY A ROUGH APPROXIMATION OF THE LANGUAGE). AYALA DOES NOT THINK THAT THE CHANGES REQUESTED BY THE ECUADOREAN SIDE CREATED ANY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS IN LIMA. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE FAILURE OF ECUADOR TO ACCEPT ONE HUNDRED PERCENT THE PERUVIAN DRAFT MAY NOW HAVE SERVED AS A PRETEXT FOR THE PERUVIANS TO BACK OFF ON THE DRAFTING OF THE STATEMENT.

6. THE DIALOGUE CONTINUED AT THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN POVEDA AND MORALES BERMUDEZ AND BETWEEN AYALA AND DE LA PUENTE IN NEW YORK AT THE UNGA AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. AYALA SAID THERE WAS STILL AN EXCELLENT TONE TO THE CONVERSATIONS. GOE FIRST SUSPECTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE TROUBLE AT THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER FISHING BOAT INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH AT FIRST DE LA PUENTE HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING AND COOPERATIVE IN ACCEPTING THE ECUADOREAN VERSION OF THE INCIDENT, PERU LATER REJECTED THE ECUADOREAN COMPLAINTS. DE LA PUENTE RELEPHONED AYALA AND PROMISED HIM A LETTER OF EXPLANATION, BUT AYALA SAID IT HAD NEVER COME. AYALA INTERPRETED THE PERU FLIPFLOP ON THIS ISSUE TO MEAN THAT THE MILITARY HAD OPPOSED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CONCILIATORY POSITION. ECUADOR WAS DISAPPOINTED WHEN ITS

ATTEMPTS TO FOLLOW UP THE FISHING INCIDENT WITH A PROPOSAL FOR TALKS ON HOW TO AVOID FURTHER MARITIME PROBLEMS, WERE GREETED AT FIRST WITH INTEREST IN THE PERU FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT WITH NOTHING MORE IN THREE MONTHS.

7. AYALA REVIEWED ONCE AGAIN THE JANUARY BORDER INCIDENTS, THE PERUVIAN REACTION TO WHICH HAD SEVERELY SHOCKED ECUADOR. HE OBSERVED THAT THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THE PREVIOUS BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT PROBABLY DIED AT THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 QUITO 01067 02 OF 03 172157Z

TIME. AYALA THINKS NOW THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN PURPOSELY GOADED INTO MAKING HIS FEBRUARY 9 SPEECH BY TWO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY DE LA PUENTE, BOTH OF WHICH GAVE WHAT GOE CONSIDERED AN UNACCEPTABLY TENDENTIOUS ACCOUNT OF THE ISSUES BEING DISCUSSED. HE CLAIMED THAT ALTHOUGH HIS RESPONSE MERELY RESTATED THE ECUADOR THESIS, THE OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL REACTION FROM PERU HAD BEEN THE RHETORICAL EQUIVALENT F A DECLARATION OF WAR. HE DESCRIBED THE PERUVIAN ATTITUDE AS BELIGERENT AND SEVERE, REPRESENTING A TOTAL REJECTION OF EVERYTHING THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS.

8. AYALA SAID THAT THE SUPREME COUNCIL HAD DECIDED FEBRUARY 15 THAT IT WOULD NOT ISSUE AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE IN RESPONSE TO PERU'S. THIS DECISION GREW OUT OF AN ECUADOREAN ASSESSMENT THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT PERU ACTUALLY WAS SEEKING ESCALATION IN ORDER TO CREATE A WAR ATMOSPHERE. ECUADOR, HE SAID WAS NOT PREPARED FOR WAR AND WAR IS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO ITS NATIONAL BELIEFS AND TRADITIONS. PERU COULD TAKE QUITO IN TWO DAYS, HE ADMITTED. BECAUSE OF THIS A POLICY OF "PRUDENCE AND SERENITY" HAD BEEN ADOPTED SO AS NOT TO GIVE PERU ANY FURTHER PRETEXT.

9. AYALA COMMENTED THAT PERU WAS STILL EXPLOITING HIS FEBRUARY 9 SPEECH. HE HAD HEARD ONLY THAT DAY POPULAR ASSEMBLIES ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN LIMA DAMNING ECUADOR AND ITS FOREIGN MINISTER. THE GOE HAD ASKED THE ECUADOREAN PRESS NT TO PUBLISH SOME OF THE MORE PROVOCATIVE RELEASES EMANATING FROM LIMA SO AS NOT TO EXCITE ECUADOREAN PASSIONS. ECUADOR WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT PERU'S INTENTIONS AND GOING OUT OF ITS WAY TO LET THE INCIDENT COOL. AYALA SAID THAT ECUADOR'S OBJECTIVE AT THE MOMENT WAS TO KEEP TALKING TO PERU FOR AS MANY YEARS AS IT TAKES IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT WHEN THE SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE SUFFICIENTLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 QUITO 01067 02 OF 03 172157Z

IN ORDER TO PERMIT A RENEWAL OF THE CONVERSATION. A TIP
OFF ON PERU'S WILLINGNESS TO RESTART THE DIALOGUE IS
WHETHER PERUVIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS WOULD
ACCEPT AN INVITATION TO COME TO QUITO ON SUNDAY FOR
CONVERSATIONS. IF THEY DID NOT COME (AND AYALA EVIDENTLY
DOUBTED THEY WOULD) IT WOULD SIGNAL THAT THE DIALOGUE
WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT SOME MONTHS BEFORE BEING RENEWED.
AYALA SAID THAT THE GOE WAS DEFINITELY CONCERNED THAT
THIS IS NOT THE LAST OF THESE BILATERAL FLAREUPS. PERU

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 QUITO 01067 03 OF 03 172208Z
ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 INRE-00
NSAE-00 DODE-00 L-01 NSCE-00 PA-01 SP-02 PM-03
OES-02 DLOS-02 ACDA-10 IO-06 /053 W
-----080031 172236Z /75

O R 172040Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7348
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 QUITO 1067

LIMDIS

COULD FABRICATE NEW INCIDENTS EVERY FEW WEEKS AND IT WAS
BEYOND ECUADOR'S POWER TO CONTROL THE SITUATION UNILATERALLY.
HE DECLARED THAT GOE WAS FRANKLY WORRIED THAT THESE
RHETORICAL PROVOCATIONS MIGHT LEAD TO A DISRUPTION OF PEACE AND
PLEADED THAT THE US USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO CALM DOWN
THE PERUVIANS.

10. I THANKED AYALA FOR HIS PRESENTATION AND TOLD HIM THAT
WE AGREED THAT US COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO THE EVENTS
THAT HE HAS
DESCRIBED. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD STATED HIS

INTEREST IN RELIEVING TENSIONS IN THE ANDES THROUGH
DIRECT CONSULTATIONS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND HAD
REITERATED THAT INTEREST SEVERAL TIMES SINCE SEPTEMBER.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE US WOULD NOT BACK ANY SINGLE
SOLUTION OR FORMULA AND COULD NOT REFLECT ANY PARTIALITY.
I SAID THAT USG BELIEVED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION
COULD BENEFIT BY REMOVING IT FROM THE PRESS AND RETURNING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 QUITO 01067 03 OF 03 172208Z

IT TO THE NEGOTIATING SALON, ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS
WAS THE GOE POSITION AS AYALA HAD EXPLAINED IT. FINALLY,
I CALLED ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES
PRESENTED BY THE SCHEDULED VISITS OF ADMIRAL OLMEDO AND
THE TRAINING SHIP TO STILL THE TROUBLED WATERS.

11. AYALA REPLIED THAT GOE DID NOT EXPECT US TO
SUPPORT ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT ONLY TO DO WHAT IT
COULD TO REDUCE TENSIONS. HE REVEALED THAT OLMEDO TRIP
HAD BEEN POSTPONED AS TOO RISKY IN VIEW OF THE INFLAMMATORY
RHETORIC AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT WERE NOW OCCURRING
IN LIMA. THE SUPREME COUNCIL FEARED THAT SOME INSULT
TO OLMEDO MIGHT OCCUR DURING HIS STAY AND THAT THE
RESULTING DAMAGE MIGHT BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN.
HOWEVER, THE TRAINING SHIP VISIT SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 13
IS STILL ON, SAID AYALA.

12. IN REGARD TO A BORDER SETTLEMENT, I ASKED WHAT WOULD
BE ECUADOR'S MINIMUM POSITION. I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD
INCLUDE AN ENCLAVE ON THE RIVER, OR A CORRIDOR LEADING
TO THE NAVIGABLE PART OF THE MARANON. AYALA REPLIED
QUITE CANDIDLY THAT ECUADOR WAS LOOKING FOR THE MINIMUM
SYMBOLIC, NOT PRACTICAL, OUTLET ON THE AMAZON/MARANON.
AN ENCLAVE WOULD NOT SERVE THIS PURPOSE BECAUSE OF LACK
OF SOVEREIGN ACCESS. HOWEVER, A NARROW CORRIDOR
DRAWN EVEN ABOVE THE PONGO DE MANSERICHE (THE BEGINNING
OF THE NAVIGABLE PORTION OF THE AMAZON) WOULD SUFFICE.

13. I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE THE UNDERLYING REASONS
FOR THE PERUVIAN ATTITUDE. AYALA RESPONDED THAT PERU
IS ATTEMPTING TO DISTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM ITS
INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THAT CHILE'S
PREOCCUPATION WITH ARGENTINA WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. HE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 QUITO 01067 03 OF 03 172208Z

ALSO SPECULATED WHETHER PERU SIMPLY WISHED TO BREAK
OFF THE BORDER TALKS BECAUSE OF THEIR TERRITORIAL

IMPLICATIONS BUT COULD NOT WITHDRAW EASILY BECAUSE OF ITS ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US AND THE INTEREST OF PRESIDENT CARTER IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE BORDER PROBLEM.

14. I QUERIED AYALA WHETHER IN VIEW OF THE USE OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT PEREZ'S NAME BY BOTH HIM AND PERU THERE HAD BEEN ANY REACTION FROM CARACAS. AYALA SAID THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN BUT HE HAD ASKED THE ECUADOREAN AMBASSADOR THERE TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. AYALA CHARACTERIZED PERU'S CHARGES THAT ECUADOR'S ATTITUDE WAS AFFECTING THE ANDEAN PACT AS CHILDISH. THE CURRENT BORDER PROBLEM IS NOT ONE EXCLUSIVELY OF ECUADOR NOR PERU BUT PART ONE OF THOSE INTRANSIGENT PROBLEMS WHERE BOTH SIDES WERE PERHAPS TO BLAME.

15. I ASKED AYALA ABOUT CHARGES THAT ECUADOR HAS BEEN ACTING AS A STALKING HORSE FOR CHILE IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS. AYALA SAID THAT THOUGH ECUADOR MAINTAINS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHILE, ITS COOPERATION IS BASED FUNDAMENTALLY ON MUTUAL INTEREST VIS A VIS PERU AND THERE IS NOTHING INHERENT IN IT. SHOULD PERU ACCOMMODATE ECUADOR, PERU MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE BETTER ON CHILE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY LITTLE COULD BE DONE ABOUT THAT.

16. AYALA STATED HE WAS CONSIDERING CALLING IN THE PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR IN ORDER TO HAVE HIM CONVEY TO DE LA PUENTE HIS "DISAPPOINTMENT, PAIN AND CONCERN" ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF ECUADOR-PERU RELATIONS. HE CONCLUDED BY HOPING THAT PERU WOULD SEE IT IN ITS INTEREST TO PULL IN ITS HORNS BUT MEANWHILE THE US COULD DO A GREAT DEAL TO TALK PERU INTO A MORE RATIONALE, AND LESS DANGEROUS, FRAME OF MIND.

CORR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 QUITO 01067 03 OF 03 172208Z

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISPUTES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978QUITO01067
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780074-0973
Format: TEL
From: QUITO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780241/aaaabiep.tel
Line Count: 426
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 0ce9a2d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 40486, 78 QUITO 919
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3559845
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ON ECUADORE-PERU DISPUTE
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, EC, PE, CI
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/0ce9a2d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014